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Wrongful Death Damages in Pennsylvania: A
Suggestion for Expanded Recovery
I. INTRODUCTION
The statutory wrongful death action creates a right in desig-
nated beneficiaries of a deceased to recover damages sustained by
the survivors due to the loss of life of a family member.1 Tradition-
ally, damages for these actions have been limited to pecuniary
losses only.2 These losses include recovery for medical bills, funeral
expenses and the economic support the deceased would have pro-
vided the beneficiaries if he or she had lived.3 Pennsylvania courts,
adhering to this tradition, have interpreted the statute to exclude
compensation for emotional losses caused by the death, such as
1. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). The statue reads as
follows:
, (a) General rule.-An action may be brought to recover damages for the death of
an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence
of another if no action for damages was brought by the injured individual during his
lifetime.
(b) Beneficiaries.-Except as provided in subsection (d), the right of action cre-
ated by this section shall exist only for the benefit of the spouse, children or parents
of the deceased, whether or not citizens or residents of this Commonwealth or else-
where. The damages recovered shall be distributed to the beneficiaries in the propor-
tion they would take the personal estate of the decedent in the case of intestacy and
without liability to creditors of the deceased person under the statutes of this
Commonwealth.
(c) Special damages.-The plaintiff in an action under subsection (a) shall be en-
titled to recover, in addition to other damages, damages for reasonable hospital, nurs-
ing, medical, funeral expenses and expenses of administration necessitated by reason
of injuries causing death.
(d) Action by personal representative.-If no person is eligible under subsection
(b) to bring an action under this section, the personal representative of the deceased
may bring an action for the damages expressly specified in subsection (c).
Id.
2. Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 870, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1982). A wrongful
death action is to be distinguished from a survival action, in which the estate is substituted
for the decedent, and recovery is based upon the rights of action which were possessed by
the decedent at his or her death. Utilizing a survival action in Pennsylvania, the estate may
recover for the loss of the decedent's past and future earning power, for the decedent's pain
and suffering prior to death and for the cost of medical services, nursing and hospital care
provided to the decedent. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 309, 282 A.2d 206, 229 (1971).
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (Purdon 1982).
3. See Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 870, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
4. Id. See 2 FELDMAN, PENNSYLVANIA TIuAL GUIDE § 33.14 (1982).
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grief, mental anguish and loss of society and companionship.5
Thus, what are often the deepest losses-and in fact what may be
the only losses in the case of a minor or an adult with no depen-
dents'-are not compensable.
The rule has been changing in other jurisdictions.7 Recently,
Texas8 and New Jersey' have departed from tradition and allowed
recovery for items not generally considered pecuniary. This com-
ment will trace the historical development of wrongful death dam-
ages in Pennsylvania, explore the reasons why this law is now
anomolous, and examine the judicial approaches embraced by New
Jersey and Texas which are available for adoption by the courts of
Pennsylvania.
II. THE ORIGINS OF WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES IN
PENNSYLVANIA
A wrongful death action is a statutorily created cause of action.10
The Pennsylvania legislature enacted its first wrongful death act in
1855;" the current statute is the same in substance as the origi-
5. First Nat'l Bank of Meadville v. Niagra Therapy Mfg. Corp., 229 F. Supp. 460, 470
(W.D. Pa. 1964) (applying Pennsylvania law); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318, 330
(1858).
6. See Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47 NOTRE DAMEs
LAW. 197 (1971).
7. Thirty-nine states now allow recovery for emotional losses such as loss of compan-
ionship or the mental anguish of survivors. Some states limit such damages to death of
minor child cases or death of adult cases. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
8. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
9. See Green v. Bitner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
10. The first wrongful death statute, Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846,
9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, appeared in England in 1846. Various states adopted statutes similar to
the English act in the nineteenth century. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 902 (4th ed. 1971).
For three hundred years before the Fatal Accidents Act was passed, there was no civil cause
of action at common law for wrongful death. English law, however, had not always taken
that position. The accidental killing of a human being was a compensable wrong even before
the Norman Conquest. POLLACK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 48 (1895).
Apparently damages were available for wrongful death in some of the colonies, including
Pennsylvania, prior to 1750, at which point the English rule of no damages was adopted in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere until after Lord Campbell's Act was passed. MoRRIs, STUDIES IN
THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 252-58 (1959). See also Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful
Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043 (1964-1965) which traces the history of very early common law
death actions which preceded the nineteenth century statutes.
11. 1855 Pa. Laws 309. An act passed in 1851 provided that when death was caused by
violence or negligence and no suit was brought by the injured party during his life, the
widow or personal representatives "may maintain an action for and recover damages for the
death so occasioned." 1851 Pa. Laws 669. The courts were unclear whether the legislature
intended a survival action or a wrongful death action by this language. Pennsylvania R.R. v.
McClosky, 23 Pa. 526, 530 (1854). Consequently the act of 1851 was replaced by the death
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nal.1' Since the wrongful death statute does not now, nor ever has,
specified what damages are recoverable, the law of damages in
death actions has been developed by the courts. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania first ruled on this issue in 1858 in Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co. v. Zebe.18
In Zebe, parents brought an action to recover compensation for
the death of their minor son who was killed by a passing train as
he alighted from a passenger car.14 The trial judge's charge left the
question of damages entirely to the discretion of the jury,1" and the
jury awarded a verdict for the plaintiffs in the sum of $1,500.8 Re-
versing the trial court, the supreme court addressed the issue of
damages in wrongful death actions, noting: "[I]t is our duty to an-
nounce such principles of compensation as we think the legislature
intended by the Act in question, that there may be some approxi-
mation to uniformity of results in such cases. '1 7 The court, instead
of giving "unrestricted license" to the jury as the trial judge had
done, ruled that the damages should be confined to pecuniary
losses which the court described as the monetary value of the boy's
services to his parents during his minority plus the expense the
plaintiffs incurred due to the decedent's medical and funeral
expenses.1 8
Justice Thompson, the author of the Zebe opinion, took great
measures specifically to exclude a recovery for damages resulting
from the loss of society or the grief of the survivors. In so doing, he
noted that this view was consistent with the English rule prohibit-
ing recovery of damages for loss and suffering of the decedent's
family." He further observed that such damages would be specula-
tive.' 0 Justice Thompson's final reason for ruling out damages for
solatium was that he feared such "extravagant and exterminating"
statute of 1855.
12. There have been modifications in the wording of the act. See Historical Note fol-
lowing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (Purdon 1982).
13. 33 Pa. 318 (1858).
14. Id.
15. The judge stated: "If the jury find for the plaintiff, the question of damages is for
the jury entirely." Id. at 321.
16. Id. at 322.
17. Id. at 327-28.
18. Id. at 330. In setting forth the pecuniary loss only rule, the court relied on the
precedent set by the English courts. See Blake v. Midland Rep., 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep.
35, 42-43 (Q.B. 1852).
19. Zebe, 33 Pa. at 329.
20. Justice Thompson observed: "No money could measure the affliction." Id. at 330.
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damages could ruin the railroads."'
The pecuniary loss only rule was restated in Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co. v. Vandever,22 an 1860 adult death case. In this case, a
widow sued the railroad after her husband died as a result of a fall
from a railroad car. He fell as he was put off of a passenger car
because he did not produce his ticket." As in the Zebe case the
trial court's charge on damages was that the jurors should let their
own good sense determine the amount if they found for the plain-
tiff.24 The supreme court, on appeal, noted that although civil law
and Scottish law allowed non-pecuniary damages in death cases,
this was not the law in Pennsylvania."
The rules set down in the early cases on wrongful death action
damages have continued unaltered to the present day.2a The pre-
sent state of the law in Pennsylvania is a result of mid-nineteenth
century judicial thought when American courts relied heavily on
English precedent in tort law; 27 when there was great uncertainty
about awarding damages for emotional suffering because such
damages were feared to be too speculative;28 and when the law re-
flected a social and economic policy to protect the railroads from
liability costs.29 Due to the fundamental changes in viewpoint
which have occurred, the rule is obsolete today.
III. ANOMOLIES IN THE PRESENT LAW
A. The Historical Rationale is No Longer Relevant
The pecuniary loss only rule has developed from case law, not
from statutory proscription. 0 Thus, the rule is based purely on
precedent and an examination of the rationale on which the early
cases establishing this precedent were decided reveals that the un-
21. Justice Thompson wrote: "No road, great or small, but would fall beneath the
weight of such a rule, if applied; and for an injury happening by a mere oversight, amount-
ing of course, to negligence, by some agent in the transit of the cars, it would be a severe
penalty to visit the company with...." Id.
22. 36 Pa. 298 (1860).
23. Id. at 301.
24. Id. at 303. The jury brought in a verdict of $1,734. Id. at 302.
25. Id. at 304.
26. Compare Zebe, 33 Pa. 318, 330 (1858), with Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F.
Supp. 870. 878 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
27. FRIEDMAN, A HisToRv OF AMERICAN LAW 409 (1973).
28. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318, 330 (1858). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
29. See GILMORE, THE AGES oF AMERICAN LAW 62-67 (1977) for the development of
legal theories fostering laissez-faire economics and limits on damages.
30. See Speiser & Malawer, An American Tragedy: Damages for Mental Anguish of
Bereaved Relations in Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TuL. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1976).
890 Vol. 22:887
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derlying basis of the pecuniary loss rule is outmoded and obsolete.
One argument cited by nineteenth century Pennsylvania courts
for denying non-pecuniary damages was English precedent; the
English cases interpreting the Fatal Accidents Act had set forth
the rule.81 The Pennsylvania statute was based on the English stat-
ute, 2 thus English cases were logical precedent. American courts,
for the most part, however, have stopped relying on English prece-
dent;"3 consequently, what was an expected argument in the nine-
teenth century is no longer persuasive in the late twentieth
century.
A second argument put forth as a basis for limiting recovery was
that non-pecuniary damages were too speculative.' Damages for
pain and suffering in personal injury cases were available in the
nineteenth century but the concept that other non-pecuniary
losses were generally compensable remained to become more firmly
established in twentieth century law. 5 Recovery for fright and
shock,86 humiliation,37 invasion of privacy" and other non-pecuni-
ary injuries have become widely established in American tort law
in the one hundred and thirty years since the original formulation
of the Pennsylvania rules for wrongful death damages. Thus, the
argument by the court in Zebe, that the affliction could not be
measured,3 9 is not an argument that should be seriously advanced
today.
The other argument made for limiting recovery, the socio-eco-
nomic policy of protecting the railroads from financial losses," did
not even survive until the end of the nineteenth century. In 1868
31. Zebe v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 33 Pa. 318, 328-29 (1858).
32. Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
33. FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 98-100.
34. Zebe v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 33 Pa. 318, 330 (1858). See supra note 20 and
accompanying text. See also PROSSER, supra note 10, at 50.
35. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 50.
36. Id. See Neiderman v. Brosky, 436 Pa. 401, 413, 261 A.2d 84, 90 (1970) (plaintiff
may recover for fright and shock suffered while watching his son struck by defendant's
auto).
37. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 50. Damages for humiliation may be recovered in Penn-
sylvania under the cause of action of invasion of privacy. Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 99,
151 A.2d 476, 479 (1959). See infra note 38.
38. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 802-18. The seminal article on this cause of action ap-
peared in the late nineteenth century. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). See Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 94-95, 125
A.2d 644, 647-48 (1956) which sets out the development of invasion of privacy as a cause of
action in Pennsylvania.
39. Zebe v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 33 Pa. 318, 330 (1858).
40. Id. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act which limited a com-
mon carrier's liability for personal injury to $3,000 and for death to
$5,000."1 This act and its ramifications were debated during the
constitutional convention in 1872-1873. The constitutionalists
viewed the act of 1868 as being unjust to the victim, as arbitrary
and unfair. 42 The remedy was to add a provision to Pennsylvania's
Constitution in 1874 providing that the legislature could not limit
the amount to be recovered for personal injury, property damages
or death.43 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the Act of
1868 unconstitutional in 1880," and, thus, the protectionist argu-
ment only survived approximately twenty-five years. Consequently,
none of the arguments on which the original rule of limited dam-
ages was based have survived to the present time. With no persua-
sive legal foundation justifying the rule, it should be changed.
B. The Pecuniary Loss Only Rule and Survivors' Compensation
1. Inadequacy of Damages
The wrongful death action was created by statute to compensate
certain named beneficiaries for their own personal losses which
were caused by a family member's death.45 Compensation for these
41. 1868 Pa. Laws 58. Section 2 reads as follows:
That in all actions now or hereafter instituted against common carriers or corpora-
tions owning, operating or using a railroad as a public highway, whereon steam or
other motive power is used, to recover for loss and damage sustained and arising
either from personal injuries or loss of life, and for which, by law, such carrier or
corporation could be held responsible, only such compensation for loss and damage
shall be recovered as the evidence shall clearly prove to have been pecuniarily suf-
fered or sustained, not exceeding, in case of personal injury, the sum of three thou-
sand dollars, nor in case of loss of life, the sum of five thousand dollars.
Id.
42. See 2 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA
1872-1873, 727-43 (1873). See also Martel, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Pennsylva-
nia-A Constitutional Analysis, 17 VILL. L. REV. 783, 801-04 (1972) for an analysis of these
debates.
43. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 21 (1874) reads as follows:
No Act of the General Assembly shall limit the amount to be recovered for injuries
resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property; and, in cases of death from
such injuries, the right of action shall survive and the General Assembly shall pre-
scribe for whose benefit such actions shall be prosecuted. No Act shall prescribe any
limitations of time within which suits may be brought against corporations for inju-
ries to persons or property, or for other causes, different from those fixed by general
laws regulating actions against natural persons, and such acts, now existing, are
avoided.
Id.
44. Thirteenth & Fifteenth Street Passenger Ry. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475, 482 (1880).
45. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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losses is only partially available because of the pecuniary loss only
rule which has developed in Pennsylvania case law. Damages based
on the pecuniary loss only rule include the portion of the dece-
dent's income which would have gone for the benefit of the survi-
vors, the value of the services the decedent would have rendered to
the beneficiaries and the gifts that the decedent would have given
them." In addition, medical and funeral expenses incurred by the
beneficiaries are expressly provided for by the statute as items of
damages.47
The largest item of damages is often the loss of the decedent's
income which would have gone to benefit the survivors." Conse-
quently, the size of the recovery is directly dependent upon the
financial position of the decedent. It is conceded that this is an
approximate consequence in the measurement of pecuniary losses,
but, it is not clear that the real or most significant loss when death
occurs is an economic one. Because the statute was drafted to com-
pensate the statutory beneficiaries for their injuries, it should be
interpreted to include compensation for what is often the greatest
loss: the loss of the loved one's society and companionship. The
limited recovery that the present rule allows is inconsistent with
the expressed purpose of the statute."
The inadequacy of the remedy is also well illustrated by an ex-
amination of the law as it applies to an action for a death of a
minor. Commentators have often noted the anomoly of the pecuni-
ary loss only rule with respect to children.50 The loss of an econom-
ically dependent child is usually a pecuniary gain to the parents.
Even Justice Thompson, the author of the Zebe opinion5' which
set down the rule on wrongful death damages in 1858, noted in the
context of a different issue regarding wrongful death damages, that
there was no intention in the rule to discuss whether the death was
an actual loss or gain and further, that such a discussion would be
46. Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 870, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See also
FELDMAN, supra note 4.
47. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8301(c) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 1.
48. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3.4 (1966).
49. See supra note 1.
50. Decof, supra note 6; Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children: A
Nonparametric Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 884
(1974); Note, Wrongful Death of Children-The Real Injury, 5 W.S.U.L. REv. 253 (1978);
Note, Wrongful Death c¢ Minors, Missouri Ends the Fiction, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 121
(1978).
51. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318 (1858).
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"shocking.""2 Shocking or not, a pecuniary loss only rule leads nat-
urally to such a discussion. The court must ask how much the de-
cedent was earning, and how much the survivors thereby lost by
his or her death. In the case of a child whose income is limited to
at most a few dollars a week, if that, the parents who are the bene-
ficiaries under the wrongful death statute actually stand to gain
financially because they no longer have to spend money to feed,
clothe and educate the child. The absurdity is, as noted by Dean
Prosser and others, that taken literally the rule would lead to the
parents paying the tortfeasors."
2. Devices Used to Soften the Impact of the Rule
Various devices have been used in Pennsylvania to soften the
harsh result of the pecuniary loss only rule. For example, in Al-
tamuro v. Milner Hotel," a federal court applying Pennsylvania
law allowed $50,000 as wrongful death damages under the category
of "non-monetary or intangible services which the deceased would
have provided to wife and children."55 The court stated that these
damages included the value of the society and comfort the dead
man would have given to his family had he lived, the work around
the house and the "guidance, tutelage and moral upbringing he
would have given his children."5 This sounds very much like a de-
parture from the pecuniary loss only rule although the court an-
nounced earlier in the same discussion that pecuniary losses only
are allowed under the Pennsylvania wrongful death statute.5
7
The Altamuro court relied on Spangler v. Helm's New York-
Pittsburgh Motor Express" as authority for allowing damages for
52. North Pa. R.R. v. Robinson, 44 Pa. 175, 179 (1863) ($1500 verdict should be di-
vided among joint plaintiffs per the intestate laws, regardless of actual damages each indi-
vidually suffered).
53. This is obviously an extreme statement. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249,
251 (Tex. 1983). PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 909 (4th ed. 1971). The harshness of the rule
as applied to minors has been softened in Pennsylvania since Pennsylvania courts allow
recovery for the loss of future earnings of a deceased minor under the survival action. Prince
v. Adams, 229 Pa. Super. 150, 154, 324 A.2d 358, 360 (1974).
54. 540 F. Supp. 870, 879 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (a forty-three year old husband and father of
three was killed while attempting a rescue in a hotel fire).
55. Id.
56. Id. The court cited the following cases in support of this item of damages: Thomas
v. Conemaugh Black Lick R.R., 133 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Pa. 1955), afl'd, 234 F.2d 429 (3d
Cir. 1956); Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d
490 (1959); Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549 (1930).
57. 540 F. Supp. at 878.
58. 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959).
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loss of the decedent's society. In Spangler, the decedent was a
thirty-six year old working wife and mother for whose death in a
vehicle accident a jury awarded approximately $46,000 in a com-
bined survival-wrongful death action." A portion of the award had
been for loss of her services to the family. Speaking for the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court the late Justice Musmanno noted that,
even though the late Mrs. Spangler's services of love could not be
converted into a precise money award, the tortfeasor was still re-
sponsible for the loss of these services. After discussing the evi-
dence of the great devotion and services performed by Mrs. Span-
gler presented at trial, Justice Musmanno wrote, "All these
things,-such as companionship, comfort, society, guidance, solace
and protection which go into the vase of family happiness-are
things for which a wrongdoer must pay when he shatters the
vase." 60 In neither Altamuro6" nor Spanglere2 did the court depart
from the pecuniary loss only rule. The courts rather gave pecuni-
ary value to the services of the parents, viewing the loss of these
services as actual economic losses, rather than as emotional losses.
In order to provide compensation for the death of a minor, the
loss of present and future earnings can be sought under the sur-
vival act with the recovery being sought in the name of the es-
tate." Courts usually consider the parents' financial position, level
of education and career when speculating on the future earnings of
a young child.e Although these guesses about a child's future allow
the parents to recover, they are subject to the same criticisms
which can be levelled when lost earnings are the major portion of a
wrongful death award: it is not a measurement of the real loss. 5
Plaintiffs have been making direct assaults on the rule from the
59. Id. at 483, 153 A.2d at 491.
60. Id. at 485, 153 A.2d at 492. Apparently the loss of the decedent's society and ser-
vice had been apportioned to the survival action damages, but it could have been correctly
apportioned to the wrongful death damages as well. Recovery for lost earnings and services
is available under both statutes. When survival and death actions are joined for trial, the
jury is instructed to bring in separate damages under each action pursuant to PA. R. Civ. P.
213(e). The court will then mold the verdict to prevent a double recovery. See Ferne v.
Chadderton, 363 Pa. 191, 69 A.2d 104 (1949).
61. 540 F. Supp. at 879 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
62. 396 Pa. at 485, 153 A.2d at 492.
63. Lost earnings awards can usually be sought under either statute when the person
bringing the action is a spouse. In the case of a parent bringing a wrongful death action,
there would be little recovery for lost earnings because the parents are unlikely to be depen-
dent on a child's future earnings.
64. Frankel v. Willow Brook Marina, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 320, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1967);
Prince v. Adams, 220 Pa. Super. 150, 152, 324 A.2d 358, 359 (1974).
65. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
1984 895
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time it was enunciated in 1858.6 Although occasional awards, espe-
cially in the case of a parent's death, are allowed for loss of com-
panionship, officially, the pecuniary loss only rule is still applicable
in Pennsylvania.
6 7
IV. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS OF SISTER STATES
Thirty-nine states today allow recovery for emotional losses in a
wrongful death action. 8 Of these, twenty-five states have statutes
which specifically allow for loss of companionship, mental anguish,
or both.6 9 In other jurisdictions, the law has been developed by the
courts through interpretation of their wrongful death statutes.7
66. For example, in Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Pa. 453 (1866) (where a minor child was
killed in defendant's rolling mill) the court observed: "Plaintiffs are not to be allowed for
the agonized feelings of parents, nor the loss of his society .... The jury gave $200 in dam-
ages and we see no error of which the plaintiff could complain." Id. at 459 (citation omit-
ted). In Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 23, 161 A.2d 367, 372-73 (1960) the supreme court
noted that recovery for loss of life's pleasures was not appropriate in wrongful death or
survival actions. Similarly, the superior court remanded in Willinger v. Mercy Cath. Med.
Ctr., 241 Pa. Super. 456, 362 A.2d 280 (1976), a/I'd, 482 Pa. 441, 393 A.2d 1188 (1978) be-
cause the trial court judge had allowed "loss of life's amenities" as part of the damages in a
wrongful death and survival action. Id.
67. Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 870, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Spangler v.
Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 483, 153 A.2d 490, 492 (1959). See
also Buchecker v. Reading Co., 271 Pa. Super. 35, 57, 412 A.2d 147, 158 (1979) where the
court said that the widow of the thirty-four year old decedent whose car collided with one of
the defendant's trains was entitled to recover for the society and comfort the family would
have received if he had lived. Id.
68. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See infra notes 69-70.
69. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(c)(4)(1983) (loss of consortium for spouse); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 27-909 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West
Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1976); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.135 (Baldwin 1979) (loss of companionship of deceased minor child only);
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804(b)
(1983); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904 (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, §
2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); MICH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(2) (Supp. 1983-
1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.085 (1979); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Page Supp. 1982); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1053, 1055 (West Supp. 1983-1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020(2)(d)
(1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1.2 (Supp. 1983) (loss of companionship of deceased parent
when beneficiaries are unemancipated minors); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492(b) (Supp.
1981) (loss of companionship and love of deceased minor child); VA. CODE § 8.01-52 (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1983-1984) (loss of companionship and love
of a deceased minor child); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.04(4) (West
1983); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-102(c) (1977).
70. In the following states the wrongful death statutes permit the court or jury to
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The supreme courts of New Jersey 1 and Texas 72 have recently
made changes in the respective interpretations of their statutes.
The two courts used different approaches, but reached the same
conclusion, permitting a broader recovery in wrongful death cases.
A. The New Jersey Approach: Green v. Bitner
The wrongful death statute in New Jersey, unlike Pennsylva-
nia's, specifically includes a reference to "the pecuniary injuries re-
sulting from such death."" In Green v. Bitner,7 ' the plaintiffs had
prevailed at trial on liability, but the jury had returned no dam-
ages. 75 The decedent was a high school senior who had been killed
in an automobile accident.7 The trial judge had instructed the jury
that her family's damages should be measured by the value of her
services and household chores minus the cost of her support and
maintenance. Consequently, the jury returned no damages. 77 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded for a new
award such damages as are just and the courts have interpreted this language to include loss
of companionship or mental anguish of the survivors, or both: Arizona: City of Tucson v.
Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 433, 466 P.2d 383, 386 (1970); California: Krouse v. Graham, 19
Cal. 3d 59, 70, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (1977); Idaho: Gardner v. Hobbs,
69 Idaho 288, 294-95, 206 P.2d 539, 543 (1949); Illinois: Elliott v. Willis, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1144,
1149, 412 N.E.2d 638, 641 (1980); Indiana: N.Y. Central R.R. v. Wyatt, 135 Ind. App. 205,
235, 184 N.E.2d 657, 671 (1962) (loss of companionship of adult decedent compensable);
Iowa: Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439, 448 (Iowa 1971); Mississippi: Thornton
v. Insurance Co. of North America, 287 So. 2d 262, 265 (Miss. 1973); Montana: Swanson v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 646 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Mont. 1982); South Carolina: Nance v. Board of
Education, 277 S.C. 64, 65, 282 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1981); Texas: Sanchez v. Schindler, 651
S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. 1983); Utah: Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1982); Wash-
ington: Pike v. United States, 652 F.2d 31, 33-34 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Washington law,
court allowed damages for loss of companionship of a deceased parent).
In three states where the wrongful death statute specifically limits damages to pecuniary
losses, the courts have interpreted this language to include recovery for emotional losses:
Minnesota: Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 353, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 (1961); Nebraska:
Selders v. Armitrout, 190 Neb. 275, 280, 207 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1973) (loss of companionship
of a deceased minor child) and Ensor v. Compton, 110 Neb. 522, 524, 194 N.W. 458, 459
(1923) (loss of companionship of a deceased spouse); New Jersey: Green v. Bitner, 85 N.J. 1,
4, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (1980) (loss of companionship of a deceased minor); Meehan v. Central
R.R. Co., 181 F. Supp. 594, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (applying New Jersey law, loss of compan-
ionship of a deceased parent).
71. Green v. Bitner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
72. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:31-5 (West 1983-1984).
74. 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980).
75. Green, 85 N.J. at 6, 424 A.2d at 212.
76. Id. at 3, 424 A.2d at 211.
77. Id. at 6, 424 A.2d at 212.
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trial on damages.7
The supreme court held that the pecuniary value of the loss to
the parents of the child's companionship and guidance was com-
pensable. 79 The court noted that, although the pecuniary loss only
rule was undergoing changes and challenges elsewhere,80 this hold-
ing was not to be interpreted as a change in New Jersey's pecuni-
ary loss only rule.8' Rather, the court stated that it was adhering to
the rule but expanding recovery under it.s2 Loss of companionship
damages, the court stated, should be measured in terms of what
the value of the services of a professional companion, often em-
ployed by the aged or the infirm, might be.8 In fact, the holding
was framed in terms of what the parents' needs will be as they
grow older. Acknowledging that such an award would necessarily
be based on uncertainties, such as what the child's circumstances
would have been, how long the parents would live and whether one
could realistically attach a pecuniary value to the child's services
and companionship, the court determined that its holding was nev-
ertheless warranted, especially in light of the fact that parents' life
expectancies are increasing.
84
In holding such damages available for parents who are bringing
actions for the wrongful death of their children, the court was fol-
lowing what had been the rule for some years in cases involving the
death of a parent.8 5 The rationale used in the parents' death cases
has paralleled the rationale in Green. While affirming the pecuni-
ary loss only rule, courts have said that the rule will be given a
broad enough meaning to include the loss of a "mother's nur-
ture"86 or the care, guidance and advice of a father.8 7
The New Jersey courts have thus taken a concept-loss of soci-
78. Id. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211. See Comment, New Jersey's Expanding Scope of Tort
Liability and Recoverable Damages, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 58 (1981).
79. Green, 85 N.J. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
80. Id. at 7-10, 424 A.2d at 213-14.
81. Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215.
82. Id. at 15, 424 A.2d at 217.
83. Id. at 12, 424 A.2d at 215.
84. Id. at 15-20, 424 A.2d at 217-19.
85. Meehan v. Central R.R. Co., 181 F. Supp. 594, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (applying New
Jersey law); Hudgins v. Serrano, 186 N.J. Super. 465, 481, 453 A.2d 218, 227 (1982).
New Jersey courts allow compensation for "nurtural damages" to be awarded to children
when a parent dies. Nurtural damages are usually fixed at ten percent of the amount of lost
future earnings. Hudgins, 186 N.J. Super. at 481, 453 A.2d at 227.
86. McStay v. Przychocki, 9 N.J. Super. 365, 370, 74 A.2d 370, 372 (1950), afrd, 7 N.J.
456, 81 A.2d 761 (1951).
87. Fraiser v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 244 F.2d 668, 670 (2d Cir. 1957)
(applying New Jersey law).
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ety and companionship-which has traditionally been considered
an emotional loss and demonstrated that it is in actuality an item
which can be measured in pecuniary terms.
B. The Texas Approach: Sanchez v. Schindler
Prior to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Sanchez v.
Schindler,s" a surviving parent's damages in a wrongful death ac-
tion were limited to the pecuniary value of the child's services and
financial contributions, minus the cost of the child's support and
maintenance.89 This rule was a matter of judicial interpretation."0
The statute which the courts had interpreted to mean pecuniary
loss only is a broader one than that of New Jersey: it states that
"the jury may give such damages as they think proportionate to
the injury resulting from such death.""'
Taking a direct approach, the Texas court in Sanchez overruled
the prior cases which had interpreted the statute to mean pecuni-
ary loss only where the action was for the wrongful death of a mi-
nor. 2 The court held that a plaintiff could recover for loss of com-
panionship and society and for damages for mental anguish for the
death of his or her child.' The rationale for the decision was
largely based on the rationale of the New Jersey Court in Green v.
Bitner, that the pecuniary loss only rule, especially in cases of
deaths of children, could result in inadequate recoveries, or in no
88. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
89. Id. at 251.
90. Id. See March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, 375 (1877).
91. Tax. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (Vernon 1982-1983).
92. 651 S.W.2d at 251. See, e.g., J.A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Wigart, 431 S.W.2d 327,
334-35 (Tex. 1968); Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 157 Tex. 541, 549, 305 S.W.2d 162, 169
(1957); Smith v. Farrington, 117 Tex. 459, 463, 6 S.W.2d 736, 737 (1928).
93. Sanchez, 251 S.W.2d at 251. The pecuniary loss only rule still applies to actions
brought for the death of adults in Texas; the Sanchez holding only applies to actions
brought for wrongful death of minors. Spouses and children of adult decedents who were
economically dependent on the deceased can recover for loss of future earnings under the
Texas wrongful death statute, but when a child dies no future earnings may be recovered,
since the child had no dependents at the time of death. Miller v. Alexandria Trade Lines,
273 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1960) (applying Texas law). See also Rubenstein, Personal Inju-
ries and the Texas Survival Statute: The Case for Recovery of Damages for a Decedent's
Lost Future Earnings, 12 ST. MARY's L.J. 49, 50-55 (1980) for a comparison of the damages
available under Texas survival and wrongful death statutes. The concurrence in Sanchez
called for applying the new rule to actions brought for wrongful death of adults. Sanchez,
651 S.W.2d at 255 (Ray, J., concurring). But cf. the Pennsylvania rule which allows the
future earnings of adults and minors to be recovered under the survival statute.
94. 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980). See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
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recovery at all.9" The Texas court noted that many other jurisdic-
tions had changed their rule on damages, and also that commenta-
tors had frequently been advocating such a change."
Interestingly, the court also noted that there had been attempts
in the Texas legislature to allow damages for loss of society and
companionship and for mental anguish, but that none of the bills
had passed. The court justified taking action in the absence of a
legislative mandate by noting that refinements in tort law doc-
trines were usually inadequate when undertaken by legislatures




Both the New Jersey and the Texas courts have succeeded in
expanding recovery in wrongful death cases. The Texas court's ap-
proach is far more direct than that of New Jersey in that Justice
Spears, writing for the Sanchez majority, announced that a new
law was being made.98 The New Jersey court took a different ap-
proach by announcing that the loss of society and companionship
of a child should be considered a pecuniary loss.99 Considering the
greater specificity of the New Jersey statute such an approach was
necessary. Either rationale, however, is available to the Pennsylva-
nia judiciary.
There are several strong arguments for changing the pecuniary
loss only rule in Pennsylvania wrongful death actions to include
damages for loss of companionship and society. The historical ba-
sis underlying the rule no longer has relevance. Second, the remedy
in a death action should reflect the true loss, which includes the
enormous emotional loss, sometimes to the exclusion of pecuniary
loss. Finally, it would put Pennsylvania in concert with the grow-
ing number of jurisdictions which allow such a recovery.
Kathleen Gavigan
95. Green v. Bitner, 85 N.J. 1, 4, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (1980).
96. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983). See Green, Protection of
the Family Under Tort Law, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 237, 245 (1959). See also supra note 70.
97. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 252.
98. Id. at 251.
99. Green, 85 N.J. at 4, 424 A.2d at 211.
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